Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev

WASHINGTON, DC — The U.S. State Department has declassified documents confirming that in the late 1990s, Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev reached a direct agreement—without intermediaries—to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through a territorial exchange: Meghri in exchange for Karabakh. The American diplomatic cables reveal details that had never been publicly disclosed before.

This was reported by Azatutyun.

The idea of a territorial exchange in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations is known as the Goble Plan, named after former State Department official Paul Goble. He introduced the concept in 1992 when former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Nagorno-Karabakh on a UN mission.

Goble was not a high-ranking official at the State Department, and his proposal was not official. However, as the declassified documents reveal, discussions on this matter had already begun behind closed doors at the highest levels in the early 1990s—not initiated by Goble, but by the Turkish authorities. It is unclear who first circulated the idea, but it is confirmed that in 1992—just a year after Armenia gained independence—Turkey’s President Turgut Özal presented the proposal to the U.S. President. According to a declassified White House document, Özal said:

“I have an idea. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh is 80% Armenian and 20% Azerbaijani. They could conduct a land exchange: Karabakh would go to Armenia, and Azerbaijan would receive a portion of land from Armenia that currently divides Azerbaijan into two parts.”

The Bush Sr. administration was apparently not enthusiastic about the proposal. However, Ankara did not abandon the idea and revived it under the administration of the next U.S. president, Bill Clinton. In 1997, according to the declassified State Department documents, Turkey’s Deputy Foreign Minister Onur Öymen called U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and once again proposed resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue through border changes (Link to Document):

“Öymen said that he spoke with former Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who had put forward an idea regarding Nagorno-Karabakh: a territorial exchange where Azerbaijan would cede Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, and Armenia would make territorial concessions to Azerbaijan.”

Öymen insisted that the Turkish side had already discussed the matter with the Russians and asked about Washington’s stance. Talbott responded that such a proposal could derail the conflicting parties from the OSCE Minsk Group’s proposals, making the conflict more complicated rather than resolving it.

“Experience from different parts of the world shows that changing borders is like opening Pandora’s box. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, at best, it would lead to a deadlock; at worst, it could spark violence,” Talbott warned.

At the same time, Talbott stated that if Azerbaijanis and Armenians voluntarily reached such a decision through negotiations—without the use of force—the U.S. and the Minsk Group would support it.

However, at that time, Armenia’s ruling administration rejected the idea, as noted in a September 1997 diplomatic cable.

After the political shift in Armenia, however, the territorial exchange proposal became part of the negotiation agenda, thanks to the direct meetings between Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev. Before that, proposals involving phased solutions, package deals, or a confederation model had been rejected by one side or the other. At a point when negotiations appeared to be at a standstill, Kocharyan and Aliyev began meeting without intermediaries.

Declassified State Department documents obtained by Azatutyun show that in September 1999, Kocharyan principally agreed to Aliyev’s proposal for a territorial exchange. According to American diplomats, this agreement was made at a meeting on the Sadarak section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

This was already the fifth Kocharyan-Aliyev meeting in 1999, and one of the rare instances where both presidents publicly stated that they were prepared for compromises.

“Robert Sedrakovich (Kocharyan) and I are thinking about what kind of mutual concessions can be made,” said Heydar Aliyev.

“Yes, I must say that we have discussed compromises and how far we can go in the negotiation process,” Kocharyan responded.

The two presidents departed on good terms, even discussing how many sheep they would slaughter when the final agreement was signed—without revealing exactly how they planned to resolve the issue.

The details of this agreement are outlined in a diplomatic cable sent to Washington after the Sadarak meeting, compiled by American ambassadors working in Armenia and Azerbaijan at the time. The cable states:

“Now, the prospect of peace is more tangible than at any time since the conflict began in 1988—thanks to the efforts of Presidents Kocharyan and Aliyev.”

The same cable reveals that during a NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, Aliyev proposed a territorial exchange, and Kocharyan agreed in principle. The two presidents entered an active negotiation phase based on Aliyev’s proposals.

Following the Sadarak meeting, U.S. Vice President Al Gore sent a message to both sides, encouraging the “significant progress achieved through direct dialogue”. His message stated:

“I understand that these negotiations involve difficult compromises for both sides, but I also believe that your decision to seize this unique opportunity is wise and courageous.”

At that time, the U.S. President and Secretary of State had dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to the region for discussions on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Talbott met with Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership before traveling to Ankara.

During his meeting with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, Talbott noted that there was so much enthusiasm in Baku about the agreement that it seemed something could be signed within weeks at the upcoming OSCE summit in Istanbul. He even asked the U.S. President and Secretary of State to keep their schedules open to attend a potential Kocharyan-Aliyev agreement signing (Link to Document).

However, before Talbott could leave the region, Armenia’s political landscape dramatically changed. On October 27, 1999, Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, National Assembly Speaker Karen Demirchyan, and six other officials were assassinated in the Armenian parliament. Within hours—while Talbott was traveling from Yerevan to Ankara—Armenia’s political balance was irreversibly altered, affecting not only the country’s future but also the territorial exchange agreements made over Meghri.

Declassified diplomatic cables provide further details on this shift.

For example, Kerry Cavanaugh, the U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, stated in a classified cable that on the morning of October 27, Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan supported the Kocharyan-Aliyev agreement. Meanwhile, on the same day, Talbott informed Demirel that Sargsyan had not been fully aware of all the details of Kocharyan and Aliyev’s discussions (Link to Document).

“During his meeting with President Demirel, Talbott said that, in his meeting with Kocharyan, Prime Minister Sargsyan was hearing some details of the Kocharyan-Aliyev discussions for the first time.”

The exact details of these discussions remain unclear in the declassified cables. However, Talbott informed Demirel that Kocharyan was more cautious than Aliyev and was urging the Americans not to rush the process.

A few hours after the October 27 attack, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State conveyed the following information about his meetings with Armenian officials to the Turkish president:

“Part of Kocharyan’s caution stemmed from his concern that the Russians might not be fully aware of the progress he and Aliyev had made. He planned to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on November 5 to discuss the matter. Kocharyan was worried that Moscow might perceive this as a backdoor deal between the U.S. and Armenia, bypassing Russia.”

Talbott also noted that both Aliyev and Kocharyan requested that their agreement remain highly confidential, and Demirel promised that the information would not leave the room.

However, after the parliamentary attack in Armenia, the entire negotiation process was derailed, significantly impacting both the country’s political landscape and the territorial exchange discussions.

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