BY KRIKOR KHODANIAN
Recently, Azerbaijan’s top officials, including President Aliyev, have been increasingly vocal in their complaints about Armenia’s accelerated military buildup, perceiving a threat from Armenia’s newly acquired weapons systems.
In response, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed these concerns during a recent press conference, stating, “Azerbaijan is accusing Armenia of arming itself to divert attention from its own militarization.” He added that every state has the right to maintain a strong and capable army.
Azerbaijan’s concern is not unfounded, as it has long held military superiority, enabling it to achieve its goals through force. However, this dynamic is beginning to shift.
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveal that Armenia’s military modernization had been underfunded for much of the previous decade. Between 2011 and 2020, Azerbaijan imported $3.27 billion worth of weapons, while Armenia’s purchases amounted to only $398 million. Of Armenia’s total, $248 million was spent in 2019, following the 2018 Velvet Revolution. By the time of the 2020 war, Azerbaijan had outspent Armenia on military modernization by a factor of ten, a key factor contributing to Armenia’s defeat.
For 2024, Armenia has allocated $1.4 billion for defense—still less than Azerbaijan’s $3.77 billion—but the gap has narrowed significantly. While Armenia’s spending is focused on territorial defense, Azerbaijan’s is seen as preparation for aggression. This partial restoration of military balance has caused concern in Azerbaijan.
Armenia is now in a position to invest more in its military, aided by economic growth and improved tax collection, which in the past had been siphoned off by corrupt officials. With modern weapons already arriving from India, France, and other countries, Armenia’s armed forces are becoming increasingly capable of defending the nation’s borders and sovereignty. Azerbaijan’s recent abandonment of its “Zangezur Corridor” demand may be a direct result of this shift. Its 2022 attempt to seize the corridor by military means failed, and such an effort has become even more challenging.
Azerbaijan is gradually losing the military advantage it enjoyed over the past decade, a development that undoubtedly troubles its leadership.
While Armenia may seek compromises to avoid war, it remains steadfast in its commitment to maintaining a strong army—because only a capable military can secure lasting peace.
“MASSIS”
