By KRIKOR KHODANIAN
Russia continues to maintain restrictions on Armenian exports, particularly agricultural products, that were imposed immediately before the June 7 parliamentary elections with the apparent aim of influencing the outcome. The expectation was that these measures would contribute to the downfall of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and pave the way for a new administration in Yerevan that would be more willing to submit to Moscow’s demands.
A month has passed since the elections, yet the Russian president still refuses to congratulate Pashinyan on his victory, and the economic sanctions remain in force.
On the other hand, the European Union has extended a helping hand to Armenia by providing both financial and practical assistance to ensure that products affected by the Russian restrictions can reach European markets with a population of 450 million. During her visit to Yerevan last week for this purpose, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced that Brussels would liberalize access for approximately 80 percent of Armenia’s exports to EU markets. She also pledged financial assistance packages to help Armenia diversify its economy and withstand the growing pressure from Moscow. “If Russia closes its market to Armenian products, the European Union will open its doors,” the senior European official emphasized.
This swift and decisive European initiative to assist Armenia should not have escaped Moscow’s attention. In recent days, accusations and threats directed at Yerevan by Kremlin officials have noticeably diminished. Meanwhile, Armenia’s prime minister traveled to Russia to attend an international industrial exhibition. On that occasion, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated, “The Russian Federation is prepared to consistently develop its relations with Armenia following the June 7 parliamentary elections, once a new government is formed in Yerevan.”
Logic suggests that this statement should be followed by a gradual easing of the economic restrictions. Such a step would primarily serve Russia’s own interests. Although Armenian businesses initially will face considerable difficulties, they will ultimately find alternative markets for their products.
A similar situation unfolded after the 44-day war, when Russia refused to supply Armenia with weapons. Armenia subsequently began rearming with modern and more advanced military equipment acquired from other countries while simultaneously expanding its domestic defense industry. The results of those efforts were on display during the May 28 military parade in Republic Square.
Moscow also lost much of its political influence over Yerevan when, by pursuing its own arrangements with Baku and Ankara, it facilitated the depopulation of Artsakh. In doing so, the Kremlin committed a historic and irreversible strategic mistake. It lost Armenia without winning Azerbaijan’s loyalty, while Turkey emerged as the dominant power in the South Caucasus—a remarkable outcome considering the centuries of rivalry and hostility between Russia and Turkey for influence in the region.
It is in light of these developments that Yerevan turned its attention toward the West, strengthening its ties with Europe. Today, Armenia is beginning to reap the political and economic benefits of that strategic shift.
As much as Armenia needs Russia, Russia also needs Armenia if it wishes to preserve even a measure of its presence in the South Caucasus. To achieve that, Moscow must abandon the language of threats and sanctions in its dealings with Yerevan. Prime Minister Pashinyan and other members of the Armenian government have deliberately refrained from responding to anti-Armenian statements by Russian officials in order to avoid further escalating tensions. On the contrary, they have consistently emphasized the importance of maintaining relations with Russia.
The time has come for Moscow to reassess its relationship with Armenia and adopt an entirely new policy founded on the principles of mutual respect and sovereignty.
“MASSIS”
