By KRIKOR KHODANIAN
After a long silence, Robert Kocharian, who served as Armenia’s President for two terms, held a press conference where he addressed numerous questions from journalists. His remarks seemed aimed at shaping a more favorable public perception of himself. Whether he succeeded remains to be seen. His reemergence also appears to be strategically timed ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2026.
One of the most striking moments of Kocharian’s speech was his confirmation—made for the first time—that he had discussed a territorial exchange with former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. This revelation followed the recent declassification of U.S. State Department documents, which indicate that in the late 1990s, Kocharian and Aliyev had explored resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by swapping territories, specifically Meghri for Karabakh. Although the plan never materialized, many view it as the starting point of Armenia’s gradual recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Expanding on this, Kocharian stated that until 1999, international mediators adhered strictly to the principle of territorial integrity. Any proposal they put forth followed the same logic: “marry the right to self-determination with territorial integrity.”
The “marriage experiment” that Kocharian referenced ultimately collapsed when he removed Nagorno-Karabakh from the negotiation process, taking sole responsibility for talks with Azerbaijan. This shift reframed the issue as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than one centered on the self-determination of the people of Artsakh. Kocharian’s decision was a major blow to Artsakh’s aspirations for independence.
Kocharian also addressed the issue of the return of Artsakh’s displaced Armenians, linking it to the trilateral declaration of November 9, 2020, which followed the 44-day war. “The only way for the people of Karabakh to return is by adhering to the November 9 declaration. If Azerbaijan proposes a roadway, we can calmly say that the only legitimate path is outlined in that agreement. If they are willing to honor it in full, then we can sit down and negotiate.” However, this stance raises critical concerns. How can one revert to the terms of the trilateral declaration when its provisions have already been violated on the ground by both Moscow and Baku? With this proposal, Kocharian seems to be advocating for another exchange—one that would trade the return of Artsakh’s Armenians for the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” effectively placing it under Russian control. Given that Russian forces previously surrendered the Lachin Corridor to Azerbaijan, there is no guarantee that the same would not happen with Zangezur.
Meanwhile, the Armenian government hopes that a peace agreement with Azerbaijan might create a pathway for displaced Artsakh Armenians to return to their homeland.
Kocharian also claimed he is working to secure the release of former Artsakh leaders currently on trial in Baku. He did not hesitate to blame Armenia’s authorities for failing to ensure their safe evacuation. Instead of dealing with the issue now, Kotcharian could have used his close ties with Moscow early on, to arrange their safe transport—just as the last president of Artsakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, was flown to Yerevan. The Armenian public continues to question how Shahramanyan managed to reach safety while others were taken captive.
During the press conference, Kocharian dodged direct questions about his personal wealth. However, he did acknowledge the ongoing divide between his supporters and those of former President Serzh Sargsyan, stating bluntly that neither side accepts the other.
MASSIS
